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Abstract 
This study aimed to replicate and extend a hierarchical model of vulnerability to 
worry, with neuroticism and extraversion as higher-order factors and negative 
metacognitions and intolerance of uncertainty as second-order factors. The model also 
included a transdiagnostic measure of repetitive negative thinking (RNT) and 
depression symptoms as outcome variables to determine whether relationships would 
extend beyond worry, which has traditionally been studied within the context of 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Participants (N = 99) were referrals to a 
specialist anxiety disorders clinic with a principal anxiety disorder who completed a 
battery of self-report questionnaires assessing neuroticism, extraversion, 
metacognitions, intolerance of uncertainty, worry, RNT, and depression symptoms. 
Mediational analyses using bootstrapping provided support for transdiagnostic and 
diagnosis-specific mediation effects. Negative metacognitions fully mediated the 
relationship between neuroticism and RNT for the whole sample and for subsamples 
with and without generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Intolerance of uncertainty 
mediated the relationship between neuroticism and worry (for the whole sample and 
for those with GAD) and between neuroticism and RNT (for those with GAD). 
Implications for theory, treatment, and nosology are discussed. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Neuroticism, defined as a tendency to experience negative emotional states 
and sensitivity to stress (Costa & McCrae, 1987), is a relatively stable personality trait 
associated with a range of emotional disorders (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; 
Watson, 2005; Watson, Gamez, & Simms, 2005). Neuroticism is a risk factor for 
developing anxiety and depressive disorders (Krueger, Caspi, Moffitt, Silva, & 
McGee, 1996), although the pathway from neuroticism into emotional disorder is not 
well understood. Identifying mechanisms, or second-order factors, that explain why 
higher-order vulnerabilities such as neuroticism are expressed as emotional disorders 
for some individuals but not others is important for guiding efforts at prevention and 
treatment of emotional disorders. This study will investigate a hierarchical model with 
two potential mediators between neuroticism and worry, namely intolerance of 
uncertainty and negative metacognitions. 
Intolerance of uncertainty (IU) has recently been defined as cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral reactions to uncertainty that bias information processing 
and lead to faulty appraisals of heightened threat and reduced coping (see Carleton, 
2012, for a comprehensive review of this and earlier conceptualizations). The 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Model (IUM) was initially developed with reference to 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Dugas, Letarte, Rhéaume, Freeston, & 
Ladouceur, 1995; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), which is 
characterized by excessive and uncontrollable worry (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). The IUM suggests that individuals with GAD find uncertainty 
distressing, which leads to the commencement of worrying when confronted with an 
uncertain or ambiguous situation (e.g. What if [something bad] happens?). There is 
considerable evidence that intolerance of uncertainty (IU) is a cognitive vulnerability 
factor for worry (Koerner & Dugas, 2008; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000; 
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Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003; van der Heiden, Melchior, Muris, 
Bouwmeester, Bos, & van der Molen, 2010) and an important maintaining factor for 
GAD (Behar, DiMarco, Hekler, Mohlman, & Staples, 2009; Dugas, Gagnon, 
Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). Intervention trials have found that changes in IU are 
associated with improvements in worry and anxiety symptoms during cognitive 
behavioral therapy (CBT, Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Dugas et al., 2003; Dugas et al., 
2010). 
The Self-Regulatory Executive Function model (S-REF, Wells & Matthews, 
1996) posits that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs increase engagement in 
repetitive negative thinking (RNT). The S-REF model suggests that positive 
metabeliefs about RNT being helpful motivate engagement in RNT (e.g., “worrying 
about my problems helps me to cope”), after which negative metabeliefs about RNT 
being harmful, dangerous, and uncontrollable escalate perceptions of threat from RNT 
and result in maladaptive attempts to control negative thoughts which, in turn, further 
increases engagement in RNT. Research has demonstrated associations between 
various forms of RNT and metacognitive beliefs (McEvoy, Mahoney, & Moulds, 
2010; McEvoy, Mahoney, Perini, & Kingsep, 2009; McEvoy, Moulds, & Mahoney, 
2013; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, & van Os, 2010), and evidence is emerging 
that metacognitive therapy, which aims to directly challenge positive and negative 
metacognitive beliefs, is associated with reductions in RNT and symptoms of anxiety 
and depressive disorders (Rees & van Koesveld, 2008; Wells et al., 2012; Wells & 
Colbear, 2012). 
Building on previous research (Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton, Sexton, 
Walker, & Norton,  2005; Sexton et al., 2003), van der Heiden and colleagues (2010) 
recently investigated a hierarchical model with neuroticism and extraversion as 
higher-order factors, IU and metacognitions as second-order factors, and worry as an 
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outcome variable within a clinical sample with GAD. Depression symptoms were also 
included as an outcome variable to determine whether direct and indirect effects were 
specific to the core feature of GAD (i.e., worry) or similar for comorbid symptoms. 
Extraversion was included as a higher-order variable to test if a direct association with 
depression found previously would be replicated, and to identify differential 
relationships between the two vulnerability factors (neuroticism and extraversion) and 
lower-order variables. These researchers found that together negative metacognitions 
and IU fully mediated the relationship between neuroticism and worry, and partially 
mediated the relationship between neuroticism and depression symptoms. 
Neuroticism and extraversion also demonstrated direct relationships to depression 
symptoms. van der Heiden et al. found that positive metacognitive beliefs did not 
mediate these relationships for worry or depression symptoms. 
Importantly, van der Heiden et al. (2010) noted that most variables in their 
hierarchical model are transdiagnostic constructs and speculated that their model may 
extend to other emotional disorders. IU has been found to be associated with, and to 
mediate, symptoms of social anxiety disorder, panic disorder and agoraphobia, 
generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and depression (Boelen 
& Reijntjes, 2009;  Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Carleton, Mulvogue, 
Thibodeau, McCabe, Antony, & Asmundson, 2012; Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 
2001; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Lind & Boschen, 
2009; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a, b; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011, 2012). The S-REF 
model (Wells & Matthews, 1996) is a transdiagnostic model describing the 
contribution of metacognitions to engagement in the Cognitive Attentional Syndrome 
(CAS), which consists of RNT along with heightened self-focus, maladaptive coping 
behavior, and threat monitoring. The S-REF model argues that the CAS causally 
contributes to emotional disorder, and there is evidence that metacognitions are 
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associated with a range of symptoms and disorders including depression 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Roelofs et al., 2007), anxiety (Yilmaz, Gencoz, & 
Wells, 2011), GAD (Wells & Carter, 2001), social anxiety disorder (McEvoy et al., 
2009), obsessive compulsive disorder and panic disorder (Cucchi et al., 2012). 
van der Heiden et al. (2010) used worry as the primary outcome variable given 
that their focus was on the core feature of GAD. However, recent research has 
suggested that worry shares many features with other forms of RNT, including 
depressive rumination and post-event processing (McEvoy et al., 2010; Watkins, 
Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). Watkins et al. (2005) found that worry, which is 
typically studied within the context of GAD, and rumination, which is commonly 
studied within the context of depression, were more similar than different. These 
forms of RNT have been found to be associated with various emotional disorders 
cross-sectionally, experimentally, and longitudinally (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Nolen-Hoekseema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky,  2008; 
Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; McEvoy et al., 2009), and there is evidence that 
they are associated with symptoms of multiple emotional disorders (McEvoy & 
Brans, 2013; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000). McEvoy et al. (2010) found 
that after diagnosis-specific confounds were removed from the instructions and items 
in various well-validated measures of RNT (i.e., worry, rumination, and post-event 
processing) items loaded on a single RNT factor in a clinical sample with anxiety and 
depressive disorders. This common factor has been found to be associated with a 
range of emotions within an undergraduate sample (McEvoy et al., 2010) and with 
symptoms of various emotional disorders within a clinical sample (Mahoney, 
McEvoy, & Moulds, 2012). Therefore, there are strong theoretical and empirical 
reasons to expect that van der Heiden et al.’s hierarchical model would replicate with 
forms of RNT other than worry, and with emotional disorders other than GAD. 
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The aim of this study was to replicate and extend van der Heiden et al.’s 
(2010) study. We sought to replicate the relationships found between the higher-order 
factors of neuroticism and extraversion, the second-order factors of IU and negative 
metacognitions, and the outcome variables of worry and depression symptoms. van 
der Heiden et al. found that positive metacognitions were unrelated to the outcomes, 
so only negative metacognitive beliefs were considered in this study. We extended 
van der Heiden et al.’s study in three important ways. First, we used transdiagnostic 
versions of the second-order factors. Specifically, we modified the Metacognitions 
Questionnaire (MCQ) by substituting the term ‘worry’ in 13 items with more generic 
terms such as ‘thinking about my problems’, because using this diagnosis-specific 
term could artificially inflate the relationship between metacognitions and the 
outcome measure of worry in particular. Similarly, we used a more recently validated 
short version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS-12; Carleton, Norton, & 
Asmundson, 2007), which has been found to have a more stable factor structure than 
the original version (Carleton, 2012; Carleton et al, 2007; Khawaja & Yu, 2010; 
McEvoy et al, 2011). Second, in addition to worry and depression symptoms we 
included a transdiagnostic measure of RNT as an outcome variable so that we could 
determine whether the mediation effects were particular to worry or were common to 
RNT more generally. Third, we used a mixed-diagnosis clinical sample and tested 
whether the hierarchical relationships would be common across subsamples with and 
without GAD. These extensions enabled us to identify whether IU and metacognitions 
were mediators of worry in patients with GAD in particular, or for RNT and 
emotional disorders in general. Identifying transdiagnostic mediators of RNT is 
crucial to guide the development of transdiagnostic treatments and to determine how 
current diagnosis-specific treatments could be used to effectively and efficiently treat 
a broader array of emotional disorders. 
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The primary aim of this study was to test an extended hierarchical model with 
neuroticism and extraversion as higher-order factors, IU and negative metacognitions 
as second-order factors, and RNT, worry, and depression symptoms as outcomes. 
Based on van der Heiden et al.’s (2010) findings, we hypothesized that (1) negative 
metacognitions and IU would fully mediate the relationship between neuroticism and 
worry and between neuroticism and RNT, (2) IU would partially mediate the 
relationship between neuroticism and depressive symptoms, and (3) extraversion 
would only have a direct relationship to depressive symptoms (see Figure 1). 
Consistent with the transdiagnostic hypothesis we expected that these relationships 
would replicate in patients with and without a diagnosis of GAD. 
2.0 Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants (N = 99, 53% women) were referred to a specialist anxiety 
disorders treatment service by General Practitioners or Psychiatrists. At the initial 
assessment participants completed a standard questionnaire battery and were 
administered the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; 
Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow, 1994). All participants met criteria for a principal 
anxiety disorder. Principal diagnoses included social phobia (n = 51), panic disorder 
with or without agoraphobia (n = 23), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD, n = 18), 
obsessive compulsive disorder (n = 4), post-traumatic stress disorder (n = 2), and 
specific phobia (n = 1). Around one quarter of patients had one (23%), two (28%), or 
three (29%) disorders, with 20% meeting criteria for four or more disorders. In total, 
46 patients (46.5%) met criteria for principal or comorbid GAD, and 24 (24.2%) met 
criteria for either major depressive disorder or dysthymia. Around one-third were 
married or cohabitating relationships (32%), 61% were never married, and 7% were 
separated or divorced. One quarter (24%) did not complete high school, 26% 
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complete high school only, 34% had a university degree, and 16% had a trade 
qualification. 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV). The 
ADIS-IV (Brown et al., 1994) is a structured diagnostic interview for the anxiety, 
mood, somatoform, and substance use disorders. Diagnoses are made according to the 
criteria described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994).  Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman, and Campbell (2001) 
provide evidence of acceptable inter-rater reliability for the anxiety disorders 
investigated in the present study (κ = .59-.79). Inter-rater reliability (κ = .63) for the 
combined depressive disorders group (major depressive disorder and dysthymia) was 
also acceptable (Brown et al., 2001). Evidence of construct validity, including 
discriminant and convergent validity, has been demonstrated (Brown et al., 1998).   
In the current study, diagnosticians were clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists. Training involved (a) thorough reading of the ADIS-IV protocol, (b) 
observation of an experienced interviewer conducting an ADIS-IV, and (c) 
administration of an ADIS-IV while being observed by an experienced interviewer. 
After the training interviews, diagnosticians compared and reviewed diagnoses. All 
clinicians had extensive experience in the assessment and treatment of internalizing 
disorders. Principal diagnosis of an anxiety disorder was determined collaboratively 
by clinicians and participants by identifying which disorder was the most distressing 
and life-interfering disorder at the time of interview. 
2.2.2 Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ). The 23-item neuroticism 
subscale (EPQ-N) and 21-item extraversion subscale (EPQ-E) of the EPQ (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1975) were used to assess the higher-order constructs. Internal consistency 
(α = .82 for both subscales; Loo, 1979) and test–retest reliability (r = .82 and .92 over 
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1 month for neuroticism and extraversion, respectively; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) 
are good, and data demonstrating construct validity are extensive (e.g., Barrett, 
Petrides, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1998; Caruso, Witkiewitz, Belcourt-Dittloff, & 
Gottlieb, 2001; Steele & Kelly, 1976). A substantial body of evidence suggests that 
these personality traits are dimensional rather than taxonic (Trull & Durrett, 2005). 
2.2.3 Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-short form (IUS-12, Carleton et al., 
2007). The IUS-12 is a more recently validated 12-item version of the original 27-
item IUS (Freeston et al., 1994; Buhr & Dugas, 2002) and measures negative beliefs 
about and reactions to uncertainty. The 12-item version has been found to be highly 
correlated (r = .96) with the full version in undergraduate (Carleton et al., 2007; 
Khawaja & Yu, 2010) and clinical samples (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). Although 
the IUS-12 comprises of two subscales, Prospective IU (cognitive) and Inhibitory IU 
(behavioral), the total score was used in this study due to the absence of any a priori 
hypotheses relating to each subscale. Prospective IU measures cognitive anticipation 
(e.g. “I always want to know that the future has in store for me.”), whereas inhibitory 
IU measures behavioral inhibition (e.g. “When it’s time to act, uncertainty paralyses 
me.”) in response to uncertainty. The IUS-12 has been found to be associated with 
symptoms of multiple anxiety disorders and depression even when controlling for 
neuroticism (Boelen, Vrinssen, & van Tulder, 2010; Carleton et al., 2010; Mahoney & 
McEvoy, 2012a, b; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011, 2012; Norton & Mehta, 2007). IU as 
measured by the IUS-12 has been shown to be dimensional rather than taxonic 
(Carleton et al., 2012). 
2.2.4. Metacognitions Questionnaire-30. The MCQ-30 (Wells & Cartwright-
Hatton, 2004) measures five domains of metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive 
monitoring, and judgments of cognitive confidence. The five subscales are: (1) 
positive beliefs about worry, (2) negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger, 
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(3) cognitive confidence (assessing confidence in attention and memory), (4) negative 
beliefs concerning the consequences of not controlling thoughts, and (5) cognitive 
self-consciousness (the tendency to focus attention on thought processes). Wells and 
Cartwright-Hatton (2004) reported good internal consistency (r = .72–.92) and test–
retest reliability (r = .59–.87) across the total score and subscales, as well as providing 
evidence of the MCQ-30’s factor structure and convergent validity. The 4-point 
response scale is: Do not agree (1), Agree slightly (2), Agree moderately (3), or Agree 
very much (4). Similar to previous research investigating transdiagnostic relationships 
between RNT and the MCQ-30 (McEvoy et al., 2010; McEvoy et al., 2013; Watkins 
et al., 2005), references to ‘worry’ (n = 13) were replaced by references to non-
diagnosis-specific terms (e.g., ‘When I start worrying I cannot stop’ became ‘When I 
start thinking about my problems I cannot stop’) to avoid artificially inflating the 
relationship between the MCQ and worry. Although ‘worry’ is not necessarily 
equivalent to ‘thinking about my problems’, because worry may be about perceived 
rather than only actual problems, the MCQ assesses beliefs about negatively valenced 
thinking (e.g., “I cannot stop”) rather than the content of negative thoughts per se. 
Therefore, we did not expect this modification to substantively alter the assessment of 
metacognitive beliefs. Similar to van den Heiden et al. (2010) a total score, excluding 
the items from the positive beliefs subscale, was calculated to form a negative beliefs 
about thinking score (MCQ-neg). 
2.2.5 Repetitive Negative Thinking-10 (RNT-10, McEvoy et al., 2010). The 
RNT-10 is a 10-item measure of engagement in RNT following distressing target 
situations derived from the RNT subscale of the Repetitive Thinking Questionnaire 
(RTQ; McEvoy et al., 2010). The RTQ was derived by factor analysing items from 
the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and Post-
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Event Processing Questionnaire-Revised (McEvoy & Kingsep, 2006) after removing 
diagnosis-specific confounds from respondent instructions and items. Specifically, 
similar instructions were provided for completing all items (rather than asking 
respondents to answer items with respect to specific emotions as in the RRS), items 
including depression symptoms were removed from the RRS, and the term ‘worry’ 
was substituted with non-diagnosis-specific terms in the PSWQ. The RNT-10 
subscale correlates very highly with the full 27-item subscale (r = .95-.96), has 
demonstrated high internal consistency (Cronbach alpha’s = .89-.91), and is correlated 
with symptoms of multiple anxiety disorders and depression in non-clinical (McEvoy 
et al., 2010) and clinical (Mahoney et al., 2012) samples. 
2.2.6 Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990). The 
PSWQ is a widely used 16-item measure of worry with excellent internal consistency 
(α = .86 -.95) and good temporal stability (r = .92 over 8 to 10 weeks and r =.74 -.93 
over 4 weeks; Meyer at al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994). The measure has 
demonstrated evidence of construct validity in clinical and community populations 
(e.g. Brown, Antony, & Barlow, 1992; van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 
1999). Worry as measured by the PSWQ has been shown to be dimensional rather 
than taxonic (Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001). 
2.2.7 Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The 
BDI-II is a 21-item measure of severity of depression symptoms experienced during 
the previous fortnight. Internal consistency (α = .92) and test re-test reliability (r = .93 
over 1 week) are established (Beck et al., 1996), and evidence for construct validity 
has been demonstrated (e.g. Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998; Osman, Kopper, 
Barrios, Gutierrez, & Bagge, 2004). Steer, Ball, Ranieri, and Beck (1997) also provide 
evidence of convergent validity, while Osman, Downs, Barrios, Kopper, Guitierrez, 
and Chiros (1997) found support for the discriminant validity of the BDI-II. 
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Depression as measured by the BDI-II has been shown to be dimensional rather than 
taxonic (Slade, 2007). 
2.3 Procedure 
 Patients referred to a specialist anxiety disorders clinic completed a standard 
battery of questionnaires during their initial assessment, including the EPQ-N, EPQ-E, 
IUS-12, MCQ-30, RNT-10, PSWQ, and BDI-II. During their initial assessment 
session patients were administered the ADIS-IV by trained psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists with extensive experience in diagnosing and treating emotional 
disorders. All patients consented for their data to be used for research purposes and 
the use of the data was approved by the Hospital’s Human Research Ethics 
Committee. 
2.4 Data analytic strategy 
 A data analytic strategy similar to van der Heiden et al. (2010) was used to 
determine mediation effects for the three outcome variables (RNT, worry, depression 
symptoms). To test the principal mediational hypotheses data were analysed using the 
PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012).  The PROCESS program calculates the 
total effect of the independent variable (i.e., higher-order factors) on the outcome 
variables, the direct effect of the independent variables on the outcome variables, the 
total indirect effect via all mediators (i.e., second-order factors), and individual 
indirect effects for each mediator along with 95% confidence intervals using at least 
1000 bootstrapping re-samples. Bootstrapping accounts for non-normality of the 
sampling distribution for indirect effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The relationships 
between the higher order factors neuroticism and extraversion and RNT via negative 
metacognitions and IU were tested first, followed by the relationships between the 
higher-order and second-order factors and worry and depression symptoms, 
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respectively. Models were first run in the whole mixed-diagnosis sample then 
separately for those with and without GAD. 
3.0 Results 
3.1 Data screening 
Prior to data analyses, distributions, skewness and kurtosis were examined for 
scale total scores. Distributions approximated normality with all scales demonstrating 
acceptable levels of skewness and kurtosis (< |.69|), with the exception of the EPQ-N 
which just fell out of the range of -1.0 to 1.0 (skewness = -1.08, kurtosis = 1.25). The 
removal of two univariate outliers resulted in the skewness (-.66) and kurtosis (-.35) 
being within the acceptable range for the EPQ-N. All models were run with and 
without these two outliers but the pattern of results was identical so models using all 
data are reported. No multivariate outliers were detected and there was no evidence of 
multicolinearity. Three and five patients had missing data on the MCQ-neg and BDI-
II, respectively, so were excluded from analyses using these variables. 
3.2 Scale descriptive statistics and internal consistency 
 Means, standard deviations and internal reliability estimates (Cronbach’s α) 
for measures used to assess higher-order (neuroticism, extraversion), second-order 
(intolerance of uncertainty, negative metacognitive beliefs), and outcome (RNT, 
worry, depression symptoms) variables are reported in Table 1. Independent-samples 
t-tests were conducted to test for gender differences on all higher-order, second-order, 
and outcome variables. Compared to men, women scored higher on extraversion (Ms 
= 9.04 vs. 6.85, SDs = 3.64 vs. 4.02), t(97) = 2.84, p = .005, d = .57 , and intolerance 
of uncertainty (Ms = 39.69 vs. 33.26, SDs = 10.23 vs. 10.28), t(97) = 3.12, p = .002, d 
= .31. No other differences were significant (all ps > .14). Bivariate correlations 
demonstrated that age was only significantly correlated with negative metacognitive 
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beliefs (r = -.23, p < .05, all other ps > .05). Cronbach’s alphas were high for all 
measures. 
3.3 Mediational models for the whole sample 
 The hypothesized model is illustrated in Figure 1. The relations between the 
higher-order factors of neuroticism and extraversion, the second-order factors of 
negative metacognitions and IU, and RNT were examined first. The higher- and 
second-order factors together explained 54% of the variation in RNT, F(4, 91) = 
26.20, p < .001). After controlling for extraversion, the total effect of neuroticism on 
RNT was significant (β = 1.02, SE = .23, t = 4.53, p < .0001, 95% CI = .57 – 1.47): 
the direct effect was not significant (β = .23, SE = .18, t = 1.27, p > .05, 95% CI = -
.13-.59) but the total indirect effect was significant (β = .78, SE = .20, bootstrapped 
95% CI = .42 – 1.23). Within the indirect effect, the MCQ-neg made a significant 
contribution (β = .65, SE = .17, bootstrapped 95% CI = .35-1.02) but the IUS-12 did 
not (β = .14, SE = .13, bootstrapped 95% CI = -.12-.38). The direct link between 
neuroticism and the IUS-12 was significant (β = 1.48, SE = .26, t = 5.79, p < .0001, 
95% CI = .97-1.99). After controlling for neuroticism, the total effect of extraversion 
on RNT was not significant (β = .05, SE = .29, t = .17, p = .87, 95% CI = -.53-.63). 
The direct links between extraversion and the IUS-12 (β = -.07, SE = .27, t = -.26, p = 
.80, 95% CI = -.61-.47) and between extraversion and MCQ-neg (β = -.01, SE = .01, t 
= -.40, p = .69, 95% CI = -.03-.02) were not significant. 
 The same procedure was followed to study the relationships between the 
higher- and second-order factors and worry. The higher- and second-order factors 
together explained 47% of the variation in worry, F(4, 91) = 20.53, p < .001). After 
controlling for extraversion, the total effect of neuroticism on worry was significant (β 
= 1.61, SE = .19, t = 8.50, p < .0001, 95% CI = 1.24 – 1.99): the direct effect (β = 
1.10, SE = .28, t = 3.98, p = .0001, 95% CI = .55-1.64) and the total indirect effect (β 
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= .51, SE = .19, bootstrapped 95% CI = .17-.93) were significant. Within the indirect 
effect, and in contrast to the RNT results, the MCQ-neg did not (β = .13, SE = .10, 
bootstrapped 95% CI = -.06-.36) but the IUS-12 did (β = .38, SE = .16, bootstrapped 
95% CI = .10-.73) make a significant contribution to worry. After controlling for 
neuroticism, the total effect of extraversion on worry was significant (β = -.66, SE = 
.31, t = -2.13, p < .05, 95% CI = -1.27- -.05). However, the direct effect was only a 
trend (β = -.48, SE = .26, t = -1.86, p = .07, 95% CI = -.99-.03) and the total indirect 
effect was not significant (β = -.05, SE = .14, bootstrapped 95% CI = -.31-.23). 
The model was run a third time with depressive symptoms as the dependent 
variable. A total of 28% of the variance in depressive symptoms was explained by all 
the variables, F(4, 86) = 8.23, p < .001. After controlling for extraversion, the total 
effect of neuroticism on depression was significant (β = 1.35, SE = .24, t = 5.56, p < 
.0001, 95% CI = .87-1.83): the direct effect (β = .93, SE = .30, t = 3.10, p < .01, 95% 
CI = .33-1.52) and the total indirect effect (β = .42, SE = .18, bootstrapped 95% CI = 
.14-.88) were significant. Within the indirect effect, the IUS-12 made a significant 
contribution (β = .26, SE = .15, bootstrapped 95% CI = .01-.61) but the MCQ-neg just 
fell short of being significant (β = .16, SE = .12, bootstrapped 95% CI = -.004-.61). 
After controlling for neuroticism, the link between extraversion and depression just 
fell short of statistical significance (β = -.55, SE = .28, t = -1.97, p = .052, 95% CI = -
1.11-.01). 
3.4 Mediation models for patients with and without GAD 
Similar models were re-run separately for patients with (n = 46, Figure 3) and 
without (n = 53, Figure 4) a diagnosis of GAD. Principal diagnoses for those with 
GAD included social phobia (46%), GAD (39%), panic disorder with or without 
agoraphobia (13%), and specific phobias (2%). Principal diagnoses for those without 
GAD included social phobia (57%), panic disorder with or without agoraphobia 
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(32%), OCD (7%), and PTSD (4%). Given the previous results extraversion was 
excluded from the models. For the subgroup with GAD the higher- and second-order 
variables explained 63% of the variance in RNT, F(3, 39) = 22.29, p < .001. The total 
effect of neuroticism on RNT was significant (β = .78, SE = .31, t = 2.49, p = .02, 
95% CI = .15 – 1.41): the direct effect was not significant (β = -.07, SE = .32, t = -.23, 
p > .05, CI = -.71 – .57) but the total indirect effect was significant (β = .85, SE = .37, 
bootstrapped 95% CI = .27 – 1.81). Within the indirect effect, both the MCQ-neg (β = 
.68, SE = .35, bootstrapped 95% CI = .21-1.77) and the IUS-12 (β = .17, SE = .15, 
bootstrapped 95% CI = .01-.64) made significant contributions. 
Higher- and second-order variables explained 60% of the variance in worry, 
F(3, 39) = 19.18, p < .001. The link between neuroticism and worry was significant (β 
= 1.66, SE = .24, t = 6.93, p < .0001, 95% CI = 1.18 – 2.14): the direct effect (β = 
1.26, SE = .30, t = 4.29, p = .0001, CI = .66 – 1.85) and the total indirect effect (β = 
.40, SE = .19, bootstrapped 95% CI = .13 – .90) were significant. Within the indirect 
effect, the MCQ-neg just fell short of statistical significance (β = .17, SE = .13, 
bootstrapped 95% CI = -.01-.56), but the IUS-12 was significant (β = .23, SE = .14, 
bootstrapped 95% CI = .04-.62), make a significant contribution. Higher- and second-
order variables explained 32% of the variance in depression symptoms, F(3, 37) = 
5.70, p < .01. However, the total effect of neuroticism on depressive symptoms was 
not significant (β = 1.56, SE = .82, t = 1.90, p > .05, 95% CI = -.10-3.21). 
For those without a GAD diagnosis, the higher and second-order variables 
explained 44% of the variance in RNT, F(3, 49) = 12.77, p < .001. The total effect of 
neuroticism on RNT was significant (β = 1.08, SE = .27, t = 3.94, p < .001, 95% CI = 
.53 – 1.63): the direct effect was not significant (β = .50, SE = .34, t = 1.48, p > .05, 
CI = -.18 – 1.19) but the total indirect effect was significant (β = .58, SE = .30, 
bootstrapped 95% CI = .04 – 1.28). Within the indirect effect, the MCQ-neg made a 
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significant contribution (β = .61, SE = .21, bootstrapped 95% CI = .25-1.12) but the 
IUS-12 did not (β = -.03, SE = .23, bootstrapped 95% CI = -.52-.37). The direct effect 
of neuroticism on the IUS-12 was significant (β = 1.88, SE = .24, t = 7.89, p < .0001, 
95% CI = 1.40-2.36). 
Higher- and second-order variables explained 36% of the variance in worry, 
F(3, 49) = 9.29, p < .001. The total effect of neuroticism on worry was significant (β = 
1.49, SE = .29, t = 5.22, p < .0001, 95% CI = .92 – 2.06): however, the direct effect (β 
= .88, SE = .55, t = 1.59, p > .05, CI = -.23 – 1.99) and the total indirect effect (β = 
.61, SE = .39, bootstrapped 95% CI = -.25 – 1.38) were not significant. Higher- and 
second-order variables explained 24% of the variance in depression symptoms, F(3, 
46) = 4.82, p < .01. The total effect of neuroticism on depressive symptoms was 
significant (β = 1.21, SE = .27, t = 4.37, p < .0001, 95% CI = .65-1.77). However, the 
direct effect of neuroticism on depression (β = 1.21, SE = .28, t = 1.93, p = .06, 95% 
CI = -.03-1.60) and the total indirect effect (β = .43, SE = .33, bootstrapped 95% CI = 




This study tested a hierarchical model with neuroticism and extraversion as 
higher-order factors, negative metacognitions and IU as second-order factors, and 
RNT, worry and depression as outcome variables. The first hypothesis that the 
relationships between neuroticism and worry, and between neuroticism and RNT, 
would be fully mediated by negative metacognitions and IU was partially supported. 
Negative metacognitions fully mediated the relationship between neuroticism and 
RNT in all samples, but did not significantly mediate the relationship between 
neuroticism and worry in any sample. For those with GAD, IU partially mediated the 
relationship between neuroticism and worry and negative metacognitions just fell 
short of partially mediating this relationship. IU and negative metacognitions fully 
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mediated the relationship between neuroticism and RNT. IU did not mediate the 
relationship between neuroticism and RNT or worry for those without GAD. 
The second hypothesis, that IU would partially mediate the relationship 
between IU and depression, was supported for the whole sample but not for the 
subsamples with and without GAD. Neuroticism also demonstrated a direct 
relationship to depression symptoms within the whole sample. These pathways to 
depression symptoms failed to reach statistical significance for the two subsamples, 
which may be a consequence of a loss of power. The third hypothesis, that 
extraversion would be directly related to depression symptoms, was not supported. 
There was no evidence that extraversion provided predictive utility for any of the 
outcome variables, although some effects just fell short of statistical significance (e.g., 
link between extraversion and depression in the whole sample) and may have been 
significant with a larger sample. 
The finding that metacognitions failed to mediate the relationship between 
neuroticism and worry was unexpected. One explanation for this finding is the 
modifications we made to the measure of metacognitive beliefs. Most previous studies 
have used the original MCQ (e.g., van der Heiden et al., 2010), which includes the 
term ‘worry’ in many items and therefore may inflate the strength of the relationship 
between metacognitions and worry in particular. We used the short version of the 
MCQ (MCQ-30) and, similar to an approach used in previous research (Watkins et 
al., 2005), we used a modified version that substituted the term ‘worry’ with 
alternative, non-diagnosis-specific terms. These modifications may have attenuated 
the strength of association between the modified MCQ-30 and the PSWQ. Some 
previous studies investigating these relationships have also examined metacognitions 
in isolation whereas we simultaneously considered the alternative second-order 
mediator of IU. IU may be a more powerful mediator for worry than negative 
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metacognitions, such that when both are included in the model negative 
metacognitions fail to add explanatory power.
2 
The role of IU differed between those with and without GAD. Replicating van 
der Heiden et al.’s (2010) findings, IU was a partial mediator between neuroticism 
and worry and RNT for those with GAD but, extending previous findings, IU did not 
mediate the relationship between IU and any outcome variable for those without 
GAD. These findings provide some evidence of diagnostic specificity and are also 
consistent with previous findings demonstrating that IU is most strongly related to 
worry, although still significantly associated with symptoms of other emotional 
disorders (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). Our subsample 
analyses may have been underpowered to detect some of these weaker relationships. It 
is important to note that our study cannot rule out that IU contributes to symptoms of 
other disorders directly or indirectly via other second-order factors, given that we 
focused on the transdiagnostic process of RNT rather than symptoms of other 
disorders. Indeed there is evidence that trait and diagnosis-specific IU are directly 
associated with symptoms of various emotional disorders (Boelen et al., 2010; 
Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a, b).  
An alternative explanation for the robust relationship between metacognitive 
beliefs and RNT, compared to the relationship between metacognitive beliefs and 
worry, is that metacognitive beliefs and RNT are less time-dependent than worry. 
There is evidence that worry is more future-oriented than other forms of RNT 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999; Watkins et al., 2005), so the relationship with worry 
may be stronger if metacognitive beliefs are assessed with specific reference to future-
oriented RNT. IU is arguably a predominantly future-oriented construct. In fact, one 
of the two IUS-12 subscales is labelled ‘prospective IU’ and measures cognitive 
consequences of future uncertainty (e.g., “One should always look ahead to avoid 
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surprises”, “I always want to know what the future has in store for me”). Thus, IU 
may be more strongly associated with future-oriented RNT (i.e., worry), as we found 
with the whole sample. Accordingly, the similar strength of the indirect relationships 
between IU and worry and IU and RNT in the subsample with GAD may be 
accounted for by individuals with GAD predominantly engaging in future-oriented 
RNT. In contrast, metacognitive beliefs may be more strongly associated with a 
general tendency to engage in RNT, especially given that we used a modified version 
of the MCQ that substituted the term ‘worry’. 
There are several implications of these findings. First, consistent with the S-
REF model (Wells & Mathews, 1996) negative metacognitions were a robust, 
transdiagnostic mediator of RNT. Interventions aimed at challenging and modifying 
negative metacognitions may therefore impact on engagement in RNT regardless of 
the emotional disorder being treated. Second, consistent with the IU model, for those 
with GAD IU mediated worry and RNT to a similar degree. This finding suggests that 
IU is not specific to worry per se but instead is common to RNT in general for those 
with GAD. Distinguishing between diagnosis-specific forms of RNT may therefore be 
relatively unimportant when identifying mediators of RNT and determining treatment 
targets. Researchers specifically interested in worry within GAD would clearly be 
well served by the extensively validated PSWQ. However, as transdiagnostic models 
and treatments are developed, evaluated, and refined, it seems important to use 
transdiagnostic measures without diagnosis-specific confounds so that specificity can 
be directly tested rather than assumed. For similar reasons it is important to evaluate 
models within mixed-diagnosis samples. Rather than attributing a particular type of 
RNT to a particular disorder it may be more fruitful to identify mediators and 
moderators of future- versus past-focused RNT, as it is plausible that different 
mechanisms operate at these different time points. For instance, the controllability 
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(i.e., ability to effect change over the stressor) and uncertainty (i.e., whether it will vs. 
has occurred) of a stressor differ before and after the stressor (more control and 
uncertainty before, less control and uncertainty after), and thus these factors may have 
different influences over engagement in RNT depending upon temporal orientation to 
the stressor regardless of an individual’s diagnostic profile (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). 
Third, the finding that for those with GAD transdiagnostic mediators were 
associated with RNT in general can inform nosology and treatment applications. If 
theories of GAD, and worry in particular, are consistently found to extend to RNT 
more generally then the utility of worry per se as a diagnosis-specific feature of GAD 
may be called into question. Engagement in worry may be insufficient to differentiate 
GAD from other disorders that are similarly characterized by RNT. The content (e.g., 
themes of threat vs. hopelessness), temporal orientation (future- vs. past-oriented), 
and breadth (e.g., health, finances, family, daily activities) of RNT may better inform 
differential diagnosis than worry per se (e.g., Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999; Watkins 
et al., 2005). Development of multidimensional measures that directly assess theory- 
and evidence-based transdiagnostic and diagnosis-specific qualities of RNT, without 
using diagnosis-specific terminology, may be particularly beneficial for furthering our 
understanding of the causes and sequelae of RNT (see Ehring et al., 2011, for an 
example of a multidimensional transdiagnostic measure of RNT). Our findings also 
suggest that whereas modifying metacognitive beliefs may be useful for reducing 
RNT regardless of diagnosis, targeting IU is most likely to impact RNT (and worry) 
for those with GAD. Future research with larger mixed-diagnosis samples, or large 
clinical samples with principal and comorbid disorders other than GAD, could more 
definitively evaluate the role of IU in driving RNT and symptoms transdiagnostically 
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and, in turn, the impact of targeting these mechanisms in individuals meeting criteria 
for various emotional disorders. 
Our findings are tempered by limitations. First, this study was cross-sectional 
so no causal conclusions can be made (Maxwell & Cole, 2007). However, our 
findings provide some empirical justification for future research using prospective and 
experimental designs that can make causal inferences. Second, our subsamples with 
and without GAD were relatively small so only medium to large effects were likely to 
have been detected. Smaller effects may meaningfully contribute to the outcomes 
studied here and should be investigated further with large, mixed-diagnosis samples. 
Third, this study served as a replication and extension of van der Heiden et al.’s 
(2010) findings and, as noted by these researchers, the study was limited by its 
reliance on self-report (rather than multi-method approaches), and exclusion of 
alternative mediators that may explain additional variance in the outcome variables. 
The need to identify additional mediators appears to be particularly important to 
worry, with neuroticism demonstrating a direct effect to worry for the whole sample 
and for those with a GAD diagnosis. 
This study found evidence of transdiagnostic and diagnosis-specific mediation 
effects within a hierarchical model of vulnerability to worry and RNT in general. 
Negative metacognitions were a robust mediator between neuroticism and RNT for 
those with and without a diagnosis of GAD. IU was a partial mediator of worry (for 
the whole sample and those with GAD) and of RNT (for those with GAD), but not for 
those without GAD. Targeting negative metacognitions may be important to reduce 
engagement in RNT regardless of diagnosis, whereas IU appears to be particularly 
important for RNT among those with a GAD diagnosis. 
 
 





 All models were re-run controlling for age and gender but the pattern of results was 
identical. 
2 
When IU was excluded from the model, neuroticism had a significant direct and indirect 
effect on worry via negative metacognitive beliefs for the whole sample (direct effect: b = 
1.40, SE = .23, t = 6.09, p < .0001; indirect effect: b = .21, SE = .11, bootstrapped 95% CI = 
.01-.47) and for the subsample with GAD (direct effect: b = 1.40, SE = .29, t = 4.88, p < 
.0001; indirect effect: b = .26, SE = .16, bootstrapped 95% CI = .04-.72), but only the direct 
effect was significant for those without a diagnosis of GAD (direct effect: b = 1.34, SE = .36, 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas and Pearson bivariate correlation coefficients between higher order, second-order, and 
outcome variables 
 Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. EPQ-N 18.11 (3.92) .79       
2. EPQ-E 8.00 (3.96) -.18 .73      
3. IUS-12 36.64 (10.70) .53*** -.11 .92     
4. MCQ-neg 2.00 (.48) .40*** -.10 .43*** .92    
5. RNT-10 33.59 (10.15) .38*** .02 .40*** .71*** .90   
6. PSWQ 64.04 (10.25) .59*** -.26* .53*** .41*** .42*** .83  
7. BDI-II 23.62 (11.41) .49*** -.21* .40*** .34** .30** .47*** .91 
Note. Cronbach’s alphas are on the diagonal. EPQ-N,  neuroticism subscale of the Eysenck Personality Inventory, EPQ-E, extraversion subscale of 
the EPQ, IUS-12, Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale-12, MCQ-neg, negative metacognitive beliefs from the MCQ-30 subscale, RNT-10 – Repetitive 
Negative Thinking – 10, PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire, BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory. 
* p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001











Figure 1. Hypothesized model of RNT and worry (bold lines) and comorbid 











































Figure 2. Model for the whole sample with significant direct and indirect pathways 
for RNT and worry (bold lines) and depression symptoms (regular lines). 



















































Figure 3. Model for the sample with GAD. Extraversion was excluded from the 
















































Figure 4. Model for the sample without GAD. Extraversion was excluded from the 
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